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Executive Summary: Corruption in the educational sector in Vietnam is recognized as 
one of the significant areas of corruption in the country. General prescriptions for 
attacking corruption have focused on achieving greater transparency, simplification of 
rules and strengthening oversight and penalties. These prescriptions are partially 
relevant for the educational sector as well. The approach followed in this paper argues 
that such generalized approaches have to be complemented with sector-specific process 
analysis to identify critical drivers of corruption in specific activities that are subject to 
corruption. The sector-specific approach argues that different organizations and 
individuals participate in corruption that appears to be similar for very different reasons, 
and unless policy identifies and targets these different reasons, it is unlikely to be 
effective. The general principle is applied to the case of corruption in recruitments and 
appointments in public Vietnamese universities. The analysis is based on intensive 
interviews and the triangulation of responses to construct coherent models of different 
processes across a range of university types. Even in this narrowly defined domain, we 
show that participants in these activities have a wide range of reasons for engaging in 
corruption, and these processes can differ across universities. We also find that some 
universities are ‘positive deviations’ in that they have achieved lower levels of 
corruption despite sharing apparently similar regulatory and financial structures. A 
closer examination identifies the structural differences between universities, with 
important policy implications. First, in a number of universities with characteristics 
similar to the positive deviations, reforms for introducing rules-based criteria for 
recruitment, promotions and administrative appointments are likely to yield results. 
However, in most universities where structural characteristics generate strong drivers 
for different processes of corruption, reforms to develop university-specific criteria of 
financing and for the evaluation of staff need to be instituted first. Finally, in some 
universities facing predatory types of exploitation, the strengthening of external 
supervision and monitoring has to be prioritized.   
 
  
                                                 
1 The first author is at the Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London, the second and third 
authors are at the Asia-Pacific Institute of Management and the Institute for Population and Social Studies 
of the National Economics University in Hanoi, respectively. We are grateful to DFID Vietnam for 
financing this research. The opinions and analysis in this paper are those of the authors and should not 
be attributed to DFID.  
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1. Introduction  
There is a growing perception that conventional anti-corruption strategies targeting 
corruption at a national level have failed to achieve satisfactory results in many 
developing countries. An important reason for this is that there are several important 
types of corruption affecting developing countries with very different drivers (Khan 
2006; Wedeman 1997). All variants of corruption are not equally easy to address, nor 
do they all have equally negative effects. Policies that fail to take these differences into 
account can fail to identify feasible strategies that are likely to have an impact on 
developmental outcomes. Effective anti-corruption strategies are therefore likely to 
involve programming at a sector level where different types of corruption can be 
properly identified and targeted (Campos and Pradhan 2007; Spector 2005). A 
disaggregated investigation of corruption at a sectoral level often shows that corruption 
in apparently similar activities can involve overlapping types of corruption, and 
different types of organizations may be involved in corruption for very different 
reasons. The approach in this paper is to use a process analysis at a sectoral level to 
reveal that what may appear to be a single type of corruption within the same sector 
often describes quite different types of corruption that are overlapping. The important 
policy implication is that even to tackle the corruption that appears to affect a single 
administrative or economic process in a particular sector, policy may have to be 
designed to tackle a number of different types of processes driving firms or individuals 
of different types to engage in corruption for different reasons.  
 
Anti-corruption analysis that aims to improve outcomes therefore needs to be detailed 
enough to identify the most important factors driving corruption within a sector, taking 
into account different types of organizations and individuals. An anti-corruption 
strategy targeting corruption in a particular activity is more likely to succeed if the most 
important drivers of that corruption have been properly identified, and anti-corruption 
policy designed to take these differences into account. An anti-corruption strategy is 
therefore more likely to be credible if the motivations of different types of agents 
engaging in that corruption have been identified and dealt with. As a result, well-
designed sectoral solutions based on detailed process analysis are more likely to be 
substantively supported by important stakeholders compared to broad anti-corruption 
programmes that everyone is likely to publicly support, but which often do not enjoy 
much support at the implementation phase.  
 
The Vietnamese education sector is known to be subject to serious problems of 
corruption. According to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer 
for 2013, 49% of Vietnamese respondents felt that education systems in the country 
were corrupt or extremely corrupt2. Though this was an improvement from 2010 when 
67% felt the education sector was corrupt (TI 2011: 1), education remained one of the 
top five sectors in terms of corruption in Vietnam in 2013. Education is an important 
sector for the Vietnamese government, with around 20% of the annual budget going to 
this sector. Vietnam has made significant improvements in its education, but as it moves 
into higher levels of middle income, the requirements for high quality education 
become even more demanding. Significant levels of corruption in the education sector 
may prevent Vietnam from achieving its developmental goals rapidly.  
 
                                                 
2 http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=vietnam  
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Studies have shown that a variety of types of corruption affect the Vietnamese 
education sector, each affecting educational outcomes in different ways. These include 
corruption in the management of public investment projects in the sector, procurements 
of teaching materials and textbooks, the award of titles and certificates, teacher 
selection and awards of teaching allowances, getting student places in desired schools 
and classes, the organization of extra classes for students, the appropriation of funds 
intended for students and the collection of extra funds from students (TI 2011: 13-22). 
However, while existing studies have identified the range of activities that are affected 
by corruption in the education sector in Vietnam, the policies suggested are typically 
the broad ones of improving oversight, protecting whistleblowers, improving salaries 
and improving transparency (TI 2011: 34-40). While there is clearly a place for such 
broad national level reforms, this study argues that a much more disaggregated sector-
level analysis is required, and one that moreover distinguishes different processes at 
that level, so that a multi-pronged policy approach can emerge that targets the types of 
corruption that can be feasibly attacked at that level.  
 
This study applies the methodological approach of sectoral process analysis to a very 
specific issue: the corruption involved in the recruitment of academic staff and the 
appointment of academics to administrative positions in Vietnamese universities. There 
are several reasons for selecting this particular set of administrative issues in this study. 
Corruption in recruitment and administrative appointments is likely to have important 
negative effects on educational standards, on the misappropriation or misuse of 
construction budgets and on the general ethics and morale at some of the highest levels 
of the educational system. The presence of significant corruption and irregularities in 
these processes was confirmed in our preliminary soundings of academics in a sample 
of educational establishments. In addition, in the last few years, there have been a 
number of significant incidents where appointments and recruitments at a number of 
major universities in Vietnam were criticized or blocked by protests, including at the 
National Economics University, the Foreign Trade University, the Hanoi University of 
Technology, the Hanoi University of Education, and the Technology and Education 
University at Hung Yen. These events involved irregularities or alleged irregularities 
in processes of recruitments and appointments. The result in many cases was that 
appointments were challenged or delayed, with a consequent disruption of educational 
activities and a loss of morale in the affected universities.  
 
At a general level, corruption in university recruitment and appointments in Vietnam is 
not unexpected given some of the general features of the country and the sector. First, 
the enforcement of formal rules is relatively weak in Vietnam, as it is in most 
developing countries (Khan 2004). The more limited enforcement of formal rules in 
developing countries is an important contributor to corruption. Second, this general 
problem is compounded by the complexity of the financing, regulatory and oversight 
structures that exist for Vietnamese universities. This complexity and lack of clarity 
makes it easier for illicit forms of discretion to operate in appointments and other 
processes, given the overall weakness of formal rule enforcement. Finally, some 
academic and administrative positions can give incumbents access to significant rents, 
making these jobs and appointments susceptible to rent-seeking activities including 
corruption. For instance, individuals in positions of administrative responsibility in 
universities can influence the allocation of significant resources, and this makes these 
positions attractive. Some teaching and research positions may also give incumbents 
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access to rents in the sense that the formal and informal income opportunities in these 
jobs may be better than in other alternatives available to these individuals.  
 
Given the characteristics of the broad drivers of corruption across developing countries, 
it is not surprising that the most common policy responses have been to target some 
broad underlying conditions. The policy analysis of corruption in the education sector 
in developing countries has generally recommended reforms to simplify and make more 
transparent supervisory and financing rules, the rules of business including the criteria 
for making appointments, encourage greater participation of consumers like parents and 
students, and greater decentralization of decision-making to the organizations 
delivering services (Poisson 2010). In principle, many of these reform efforts could 
indeed help to reduce the prevalence of corruption in education. However, the critical 
problem is that of implementation, since without the achievement of a general capacity 
to enforce formal rules, many of these recommendations are unlikely to deliver 
significant results. For instance, some simplification and coordination of procedures for 
recruitments and appointments is indeed possible, but in the absence of a major 
improvement in the capacity of the state to enforce formal rules, these steps are unlikely 
to result in a significant reduction in corruption. Our investigation of overlapping 
processes of corruption affecting the recruitment and appointments process suggests 
that anti-corruption policy in this area is likely to be more effective if the types of 
corruption affecting different types of universities are adequately identified and policies 
designed to fit the problems faced by specific universities. The study therefore not only 
sheds light on the corruption processes affecting a specific administrative problem, it 
also serves a broader purpose in demonstrating the usefulness of our methodology for 
a policy-relevant process analysis of corruption.  
 
There are important lessons for policy design. One implication is that the strategies that 
were successful in some universities in reducing corruption in recruitments and 
appointments are not necessarily replicable in all types of universities, but may be 
replicable in universities with similar structural characteristics. A further implication is 
that anti-corruption and reform strategies in different types of universities would be 
more effective if they take into account the characteristics of the university and the 
dominant types of corruption it was suffering from. A simple anti-corruption strategy 
that ignores these differences is unlikely to be effective across the board. This 
conclusion is similar to the results of our analysis of corruption in the business sector 
in Bangladesh, where we found that different types of firms were engaging in 
apparently similar processes of administrative corruption for very different reasons. 
There too, the policy recommendation was that policy needs to separate firms that are 
potentially compliant from those that will not or cannot comply with regulations, in 
other words, different strategies are required to deal with firms with different 
characteristics (Khan 2014). The general conclusion that these studies illustrate is 
therefore that policy has to be cognizant of and has to address different types of 
corruption that are likely to be involved in any specific corruption problem if practical 
and feasible policies are to be designed.  
 
2. Higher Education in Vietnam: An Overview  
The higher education establishments in Vietnam include universities and colleges. 
These establishments have specific features that reflect the history of their development 
and the evolution of the regulatory structures. Some of these specificities help to explain 
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differences between types of higher education establishments in Vietnam. However, 
there are other differences between these establishments that reflect their academic and 
research capabilities that are no less important in determining the strategies of different 
stakeholders within these establishments.  
 
Almost all state-owned universities were initially set up by different ministries to 
develop the disciplines required for their purposes. The ministry concerned would 
provide the financing for that university and it would be responsible for the supervision 
of educational quality, and oversight of recruitment and appointments. While some 
universities are still operating under particular ministries, the situation changed 
gradually over time. Universities began to diversify into different disciplines and the 
Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) became more closely involved in the 
supervision of these types of diversified universities.  
 
In 2010 there were 414 universities and colleges in Vietnam, of which 188 were 
universities and of these, 138 were state-owned. The other 226 establishments were 
colleges (196 of these were public colleges) that could in principle become universities 
if they could meet certain criteria (Vu 2012). More than half of the total number of 
universities, a total of 101, were located in the two big cities, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City. The rest were distributed across the provinces, with a greater number located in 
important provinces such as Da Nang with eight universities, Hue with nine and six in 
Thai Nguyen (Tran 2012).  
 
Public universities thus dominate the Vietnamese university sector, and moreover, the 
best universities in terms of teaching and research reputation are all in the public sector. 
The administrative and regulatory structure under which public universities operate in 
Vietnam is complex and evolving. In 2012, of the 202 universities in operation in that 
year (the number is steadily increasing), around 34% were directly supervised by the 
Ministry of Education and Training (MOET), but 44% came under other ministries such 
as the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development or the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade. Around sixteen universities, or eight percent of the total, were directly 
supervised by the Government. These include important universities like the National 
University. A further 14% were supervised by Provincial People’s Committees. The 
sixteen national universities can do a number of things without having to get approval 
from MOET, including the award of PhD degrees, sending their staff to study abroad, 
inviting foreign staff and students, setting up training programmes and initiating 
construction programmes with their own funds. In contrast, other universities need 
MOET approval for these types of tasks.  
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Figure 1. Financial and Regulatory Structure of Vietnamese Universities 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the regulatory structure for Vietnamese universities is complex. At 
a general level, MOET, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment determine the overall financial allocations for universities and MOET 
supervises the quality of programmes of all universities, carries out quality assurance 
and accreditation and approves new teaching programmes. However, at the detailed 
level of negotiating budgets and arranging supervision, particular universities can come 
under the supervision of different bodies. Some universities are supervised by MOET 
but others are under other ministries, provincial governments or directly under the 
government, and the latter are important universities that have a larger element of 
autonomy. This evolving structure of funding and regulation has resulted in a complex 
flow of funds to different types of universities with different supervisory structures, 
even though the overall supervision of MOET imposes a common minimum regulatory 
structure and standards (Vu 2012).  
 
The first important difference between universities in Vietnam is therefore that they 
come under different regulatory and supervisory structures. In the pre-reform period, 
universities directly supervised and regulated by specific ministries like the Ministry of 
Commerce or the Ministry of Finance were supposed to provide the skilled manpower 
required by the enterprises operating under those ministries. Over time with the opening 
up of the economy and the declining role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
employment generation, the planning of sectoral skill requirements by ministries has 
become much less important. Nevertheless, ministries with universities under them 
have developed their own training programmes and institutional interests in preserving 
their universities, and they have developed their own procedures of regulation and 
financing. In addition, provincial committees in charge of universities have regional 
development objectives, and again their regulatory procedures and objectives reflect 
different interests.  
 
A second difference between universities lies in the implicit funding models they 
operate under. Most Vietnamese universities get around half their funding as 
government grants, but there is significant variation around this average. Moreover, 
there are significant differences in university quality, and the level of students the 
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university caters for, which determines the strategies of revenue generation. Almost all 
of the revenue coming to Vietnamese universities is for teaching rather than research, 
but some universities are more successful in putting up additional teaching and training 
programmes beyond the ones supported by central transfers. The fees for these 
additional teaching and training programmes constitute an important source of 
additional income for some universities. The universities that are more dependent on 
government transfers also differ amongst themselves in terms of teaching quality and 
the level of students they cater for. Some of the universities that are more dependent on 
central funding are prestigious universities attracting high quality students, while others 
are universities catering to students who fail to get admission into more prestigious 
institutions, and some of these universities have to deal with very large number of 
relatively poorly qualified students. The internal dynamics of rent allocation and rent 
control can be quite different across these universities, and these features need to be 
explored a little further and kept in mind in our investigation of the types of corruption 
affecting universities.  
 
The Vietnamese government has been trialling a system of full autonomy for some 
universities under which autonomous universities would have to cover their entire 
operating costs with their own revenues. Since 2008, five high ranking universities have 
been under this ‘full financial autonomy’ model, but in fact, significant budget support 
from MOET has continued for this small handful of trial universities. If we remember 
that universities even in advanced countries find it hard to achieve full financial 
autonomy without very high fee rates that can have detrimental effects on student 
numbers and access, it is unlikely that a full autonomy model would be viable for most 
universities in a developing country like Vietnam. The longer-term goal must be to 
develop a transparent funding formula that is suitable for the needs of different types 
of universities in the country.  
 
With the exception of these five universities, most public universities in Vietnam have 
different levels of partial financial autonomy and get a substantial share of their 
operating costs covered by budgetary transfers. A comprehensive set of figures for 
university funding in Vietnam is not available, but a survey of fifty public universities 
in 2012 showed around half of their operating costs were covered by transfers, as shown 
in Table 1. For the universities surveyed in that study, own revenues generated by 
teaching and training incomes were only slightly higher than the transfers from the state 
budget. Research income was very small, on average less than one percent of the own 
revenues of universities and less than seven percent of the transfers from the state for 
direct research, though more was available for investments in research facilities.  
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Table 1 Sources of Revenue in Vietnamese Public Universities 
  
  
2009 2010 2011 
Billion 
VND % 
Billion 
VND % 
Billion 
VND % 
Total Revenue 4755.9 100 5813.1 100 6383.1 100 
Own revenue 2376.3 50 3077.9 53 3425.8 54 
   Regular training tuition 983.5 41 1410.6 46 1805.8 53 
   In-service training tuition 465.4 20 525.0 17 504.1 15 
   Joint training tuition 253.3 11 297.4 10 272.3 8 
   Distance learning tuition 84.3 4 84.2 3 82.5 2 
   College-to-university tuition 138.3 6 208.4 7 261.0 8 
   Other training fees 68.0 3 82.6 3 82.1 2 
   Research 3.0 (<1%) 2.8 (<1%) 2.3 (<1%) 
   Other non-business revenues 380.5 16 466.9 15 415.7 12 
Transfers from State Budget 2379.6 50 2735.2 47 2957.3 46 
   For regular training 1423.5 60 1622.0 59 1815.5 61 
   For research 157.9 7 158.8 6 167.3 6 
   For other purposes 52.3 2 81.8 3 91.9 3 
   For national target programs 102.0 4 112.0 4 128.7 4 
   For investment and 
development (including ODA) 513.5 22 634.2 23 658.0 22 
   For investment and 
development in research 129.9 5 95.8 4 75.9 3 
   For other investments 
(environment, sports etc.) 0.5 (<1%) 30.6 1 20.0 1 
Source: Based on Tran (2012). Figures based on a survey of fifty public universities. 
 
Table 2 shows that the reliance on transfers from the state also varies across different 
types of universities. While the average university generated just a little more from their 
own revenues compared to what it got from the state budget, own revenues were higher 
than state transfers by around 30 percent for universities supervised by MOET. They 
were even higher for universities supervised by the Ministry of Commerce and the 
Ministry of Health. This reflects the greater ability of some of these universities to put 
up training programmes and courses that have high commercial demand. In contrast, 
the national universities may be more prestigious but they cover a wide range of 
subjects and therefore the extra revenue they can earn through specialized courses and 
training programmes constitute a smaller percentage of their total incomes. The less 
prestigious and lower quality provincial universities have the lowest share of own 
revenues because here both the capabilities of the universities and the demand from 
students for specialist training is lower.  
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Table 2 Own Revenues of Public Universities as Share of Government Transfers 
Revenues in billion VND 
 
2009 2010 2011 
Average 
Revenue 
per 
university  
Own 
Revenue 
as % of 
State 
Transfers  
Average 
Revenue 
per 
university 
Own 
Revenue 
as % of 
State 
Transfers 
Average 
Revenue 
per 
university 
Own 
Revenue 
as % of 
State 
Transfers 
Average for 50 
universities   100 %   113 %   116 % 
MOET 105.8 127 % 127.5 131 % 136.0 130 % 
Other Ministries  94.4 112 % 119.8 145 % 143.3 142  % 
   Ministry of Commerce 175.0 947 % 241.4 997 % 303.7 776 % 
   Ministry of Health 91.6 326 % 125.2 488 % 154.7 613 % 
   Ministry of Culture, 
Sports, and Tourism 44.3 73 % 36.2 102 % 48.2 120 % 
   Ministry of Finance 90.7 33 % 112.9 60 % 112.3 68 % 
   Ministry of 
Transportation 107.6 26 % 125.9 40 % 122.9 45 % 
   Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development 86.9 13 % 77.1 20 % 89.5 17 % 
National universities 
(under Government) 166.7 49 % 169.6 65 % 155.0 79 % 
Provincial People 
Committee 55.6 33 % 71.1 30 % 70.8 34 % 
Source: Based on Tran (2012). Figures are based on a survey of fifty public universities. 
 
The rules used by different funding bodies for allocating budgetary transfers to 
universities are not publicly available and can vary across different types of supervisory 
bodies and ministries. For universities under direct MOET supervision, MOET is said 
to use a formula that is primarily based on the official student admission quota. The 
student quota in turn depends on a number of criteria including MOET’s evaluation of 
the university’s infrastructure (land area, classrooms, equipment and so on), and 
teaching staff (number of professors, associate professors, and so on). However, 
universities often admit students in excess of their quota to earn extra revenue, and these 
are often not declared to MOET. Occasionally problems arise because the number of 
degrees granted is monitored by MOET so if a university awards many more diplomas 
or degrees than it was authorized to do, this can create problems. Not surprisingly, there 
is a substantial amount of bargaining between universities and MOET on the setting of 
student quotas, as this determines the public funding going to the university. Other 
ministries and supervisory bodies in charge of universities use their own formulae for 
allocating budgetary funds, but the details of any of these formulae and therefore any 
differences between them are not publicly known. Finally, in all universities, the funds 
for infrastructure construction are separately negotiated. These infrastructure 
development allocations follow central plans, but individual universities can also bid 
for extra resources. Their success in bidding can depend on the quality of the case they 
can make for particular expansions based on how the university’s plans fit in with 
national plans and fund availability.  
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3. The Process Analysis Methodology 
Our process analysis develops the methodology described in Khan (2014) to identify 
different processes that may be simultaneously involved in what appears to be a specific 
corruption problem. The methodology is to focus on a specific sectoral problem with 
the aim of identifying the most important processes through which corruption of 
different types may be operating in different organizations and the incentives of 
different types of stakeholders to engage in or resist the corruption. Types of corruption 
can also be classified in terms of differences in their drivers and we use a classification 
based on Khan (2006) to distinguish between a number of important types of 
corruption. The methodology involves identifying the processes at play in 
organizations of different types that are involved in corruption in similar activities. The 
aim is to identify the different processes that policy needs to address in different types 
of organizations, if anti-corruption is to be effective.  
 
The identification of different processes is based on intensive interviews by researchers 
who aim to establish relationships of trust with important stakeholders involved in these 
processes. As every corrupt transaction has at least two participants, and each is likely 
to explain the causes of the corruption very differently, an iterative approach is used to 
cross-check the descriptions and reasons given by different participants till the 
interviewer is convinced that a plausible and consistent understanding of the motives 
of different types of participants has emerged. As the reasons and motivations for 
engaging in the corruption may also be different in different types of organizations or 
for different types of agents, a number of different processes may have to be identified. 
This is important from a policy perspective because effective policy has to target the 
motivations of different types of stakeholders, organizations or firms involved in 
apparently similar activities. Policy will only be effective if these different drivers are 
adequately addressed and policies adapted for public universities of different types.  
 
In the case of corruption in academic recruitments and appointments in Vietnamese 
universities, we find that there are indeed different motivations and processes going on 
within the broad category of corruption in recruitment and appointments. This is despite 
the fact that these processes come under the same formal regulations in Vietnam for the 
recruitment, allocation, and management of state personnel as described in Decision 
27/2003/QĐ-TTg of 19/2/2003, Decree 29/2012/NĐ-CP of 12/4/2012 and Circular 
15/2012/TT-BNV of 25/12/2012. All universities are also subject to a parallel oversight 
and validation of these processes by Communist Party structures operating within the 
university and in related ministries and local governments that have oversight functions 
for the university in question.  
 
While all universities formally follow the same laws and are subject to the same 
administrative and political controls, the informal processes through which decisions 
are reached can and do differ greatly, and in many cases, significant levels of corruption 
of different types are associated with these operations. Our investigation confirms that 
the drivers of corruption in recruitment and appointments differ significantly across 
different types of universities and therefore anti-corruption strategies that may be 
effective in one type of university may have little effect in others. We also find that 
some Vietnamese universities have been much more successful in addressing 
corruption compared to others. The policy question is whether the experience of these 
‘positive deviations’ can inform reform in other universities. If their success was based 
on strategies that worked because of specific characteristics and processes that are 
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unlikely to be feasible in all universities, then a more nuanced analysis of corruption in 
this sector is required. The challenge is to understand the most important differences 
and develop appropriate anti-corruption strategies for different types of universities.  
 
A useful way of categorizing different types of corruption is to look at the different 
types of regulations and interventions the corruption is associated with (Khan 2006, 
2014). Some corruption can be associated with dysfunctional state regulations and 
interventions, which hinder the achievement of economic efficiency or developmental 
goals. For instance, some regulations may be excessively complicated or badly 
designed such that they do not promote any obvious economic or social objectives, and 
may even be damaging if they were strictly enforced. These regulations or interventions 
can be described as ‘market-restricting’ because their enforcement can prevent or make 
more difficult efficient or developmental resource allocation. The corruption 
associated with market-restricting interventions can be a rational response to avoid 
these dysfunctional regulations. As a result, in some cases, the outcome after corruption 
could paradoxically be slightly better because corruption could provide a (costly) way 
of working around dysfunctional regulations and interventions. However, the outcome 
would be even better if the dysfunctional regulations could be removed. In this case, 
anti-corruption strategies have to address the dysfunctional regulations or interventions 
because an anti-corruption strategy that simply attacked the corruption and left the 
dysfunctional regulations in place could be even more damaging than doing nothing. 
Some of the corruption affecting universities in Vietnam could be linked to unclear or 
problematic regulations, but this problem is less important than other types of 
corruption problems affecting the sector. 
 
A second type of corruption is associated with regulations and interventions that are 
potentially useful for achieving economic and social objectives. Here, corruption can 
distort the implementation of necessary policies and cause much more damage. This 
type of state-constraining corruption can have significantly negative effects on social 
outcomes. State-constraining corruption is likely to be very important in developing 
countries in terms of its negative impact. Anti-corruption strategy here has to be very 
different compared to the case of market-restricting corruption. Here, the objective is 
to keep the necessary regulations or interventions in place, though they may have to be 
redesigned to improve their enforcement. Anti-corruption strategy has to ensure that 
this type of corruption is either eliminated or at least that it does not prevent the 
achievement of desired outcomes. This requires an understanding of why different 
types of organizations may be violating regulations. Some violators may simply be 
trying to capture rents, and they can be constrained with greater transparency and 
penalties. However, some violators, particularly in developing countries, may be 
violating regulations because they are unable to comply. In these cases more complex 
strategies may be required, including exit strategies for some types of organizations or 
in the case of universities, changing some of the regulatory structures. We will discuss 
this possibility at greater length later.  
 
A third type of corruption is political corruption associated with the strategies of those 
who seek political power, ultimately for supporting other types of rent-seeking 
activities. Political corruption emerges when the allocation of resources for maintaining 
political networks involve violations of formal rules. For a variety of structural reasons, 
the organization of political power in developing countries is likely to involve high 
levels of informal rent extraction and allocation of these types, and therefore political 
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corruption is widespread (Khan 2005, 2006; North, et al. 2013). Political corruption can 
be more or less damaging depending on how it affects critical services or economic 
activities. In particular, political corruption can overlap with other types of corruption 
and make their solution more difficult. Comprehensive solutions to political corruption 
at the macro-level are likely to take time as forms of financing politics have to become 
more formal and rule-following. However, in the medium term, some strategies for 
excluding political corruption from critical areas of social and economic policy may be 
worth pursuing. As we would expect, there is evidence of variants of political 
corruption in some Vietnamese universities and the drivers of this type of corruption 
need to be carefully assessed to identify feasible policy responses.  
 
Finally, some corruption can take the form of predatory corruption, where political and 
sometimes coercive power is used to extort revenue from citizens. This type of 
corruption is clearly very damaging, but is unlikely to take on serious proportions at a 
social level except in contexts of state collapse. However, aspects of predatory 
corruption can operate even in otherwise well-working states, and we find some 
evidence of predatory corruption in the Vietnamese university sector. At a social level, 
predatory corruption only becomes significant when higher levels of the state lose 
control over lower-levels. Higher-level state officials are unlikely to collectively 
sanction predatory activities because extortion is destructive for the viability of the 
state. Thus, significant levels of predatory corruption usually indicates some level of 
state collapse. The policy response must include support for improving the levels of 
legitimacy and enforcement capabilities of the state. However, in less serious situations, 
low-level predatory corruption may be addressed by identifying the specific factors 
resulting in these outcomes. In the Vietnamese education sector, some aspects of 
corruption in recruitment unfortunately have a predatory character, with the extortion 
of revenue from job-seekers who face unattractive alternatives.    
 
Each of these types of corruption is associated with specific ‘rents’, defined as 
incremental income flows associated with particular regulations, policies or strategies 
that particular stakeholders can try to capture, using corruption. The type of rent and 
the effect of the corruption on the underlying policies generating the rent determine the 
economic and developmental effects of corruption. Our objective in this paper is not to 
examine the economic and developmental effects of the different types of corruption 
affecting the recruitment and appointments processes in Vietnamese universities. 
Rather, we will limit ourselves to examine the related question of identifying the 
different types of processes at play, the drivers of these processes, the incentives of 
involved stakeholders, and the implications for anti-corruption policy.  
 
The complex regulatory structure of universities in Vietnam combined with weaknesses 
in the enforcement of formal rules can give some university administrators the power 
to allocate critical rents. These positions therefore have a value and the process of 
getting appointments to such positions can trigger corruption. The attractiveness of an 
administrative position, like that of a dean or a head of a department or centre within a 
university depends on the resources that the incumbent can aspire to allocate and the 
discretion that can be exercised in these allocations. Universities with large revenues, 
whether that comes from the state or from their own revenues, can be attractive for 
administrative positions. For instance, universities with a long history and a good 
teaching reputation can have large student numbers. These universities get significant 
budgetary transfers from their supervisory bodies based on student quotas. Even 
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without a high share of their own revenues, senior administrative staff are in charge of 
significant flows of funds, and can make potentially lucrative recruitment and 
construction decisions. In some large public universities where there are many jobs to 
allocate, individuals in administrative positions can also build up networks and loyalties 
that have a political value.  
 
A different set of opportunities arises in universities that can generate significant 
revenues on their own outside the state budget. These are universities that have 
specialized in particular fields where substantial training incomes can be generated, or 
they have the reputation to attract students in advanced teaching courses, or in a few 
cases, generate external research incomes. These universities have a higher share of 
their own incomes in total revenues, and administrative post-holders in charge of 
internal resource allocation can again benefit from allocative decisions. However, high-
quality universities that depend on teaching for their own revenue are more likely to be 
concerned with teaching quality, and this concern can affect the types of rent seeking 
that university administrations can engage in or allow. However, all universities in 
Vietnam (as in many other countries) continue to be dependent on significant state 
funding, and in all cases the state funds significant new construction and expansion 
projects. Thus, in both types of universities administrative posts provide access to 
significant rents even though there may be differences in the strategies for capturing 
these rents given their different sources.  
 
Ordinary teaching staff confront a very different set of rent considerations, and they can 
sometimes be the victims of rent extraction. The attractiveness of a university job can 
be very different in different types of universities. In prestigious universities there is 
intense competition to get jobs, but it is unlikely that individuals without the minimum 
level of qualifications will be able to get a job, and these minimum requirements may 
be quite high. However, while this may restrict the field to some extent, there may still 
be considerable flexibility for the appointments team to choose one of a large number 
of acceptable candidates. For the candidates, academic positions in good universities 
may be attractive not because the salaries are particularly high, but because of the social 
status, job security and potential opportunities for career advancement through research 
and training, and eventually, getting administrative appointments. These calculations 
are different in less prestigious universities, where the opportunities for career 
advancement or lucrative administrative appointments may be lower. Nevertheless, the 
competition for recruitment in these universities may be even more intense because 
larger pools of applicants may meet the lower minimum recruitment criteria. For many 
of these less qualified individuals, other job opportunities may be even less attractive, 
and therefore a position in such a university may be attractive even at low salaries. In 
examining the processes of corruption in recruitment and administrative appointments, 
these differences in the types of rents across different types of universities and different 
types of aspirants to positions have to be kept in mind.  
 
To address these questions, the methodology used was to select a small number of 
public universities (six in all) that demonstrated different types of processes in the 
recruitment and appointments process. The selection of these universities was based on 
a preliminary investigation of a larger number of universities to identify the most 
important processes of corruption in these activities. The methodology did not seek to 
ensure a comprehensive analysis of processes in the university sector as that would have 
required an investigation of all Vietnamese universities. Rather the aim was to select 
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from the most important types of universities a smaller sample highlighting important 
variants of processes identified in the initial investigation. The preliminary 
investigation narrowed down the investigation to six universities in the second stage. 
One of these was a ‘positive deviation’ university displaying evidence of low corruption 
and rule-following behaviour in recruitment and appointments, and a second was a 
partial positive deviation. Four others provided examples of different types of 
corruption processes in these activities. Our confidence in our selection of variants was 
corroborated by presenting the preliminary research findings to a broad selection of 
representatives from the university and policy-making sector in Vietnam. The 
responses of these high-powered insiders validated our coverage of the most relevant 
processes and confirmed that important variants had not been overlooked.  
 
Background information on each university was collected from the relevant official 
reports and official websites. The detailed university level investigations were based on 
intensive interviews with at least three insiders in each university and usually more. 
The respondents were selected to ensure representation from both ordinary teaching 
staff and managers in administrative positions. The purpose and analytical goals of the 
research were explained to respondents over several meetings and the research 
proceeded if sufficient trust was established for a frank discussion of processes in the 
university. Respondents were assured of anonymity both for themselves and their 
universities.  
 
The interview methodology was to begin with an explanation of the objectives of the 
study and a discussion of the possible types of corruption that could be at play, and then 
engaging in an open and relatively unstructured discussion. Respondents were 
encouraged to talk freely on all aspects of corruption in their university, with 
interviewers following up on interesting observations and insights to gain a deeper 
understanding of processes where necessary. A triangulation of responses across 
respondents was also used to check the details of processes reported by one respondent 
with those of others and returning to respondents to corroborate or change details 
through a process of iteration till a consistent understanding of the dominant processes 
in the university could be synthesized.  
 
The aim was to develop a process analysis for the dominant types of corruption in each 
university and to identify the most likely factors explaining differences in processes 
across universities. Using our respondents’ descriptions of the extent and intensity of 
corrupt processes in their universities, we were also able to broadly rank universities in 
terms of the extent of corruption in the processes of recruitments, promotions and 
administrative appointments. This approach allowed us to identify the main differences 
between types of universities and in particular, to analyse the conditions that could 
explain outcomes in the positive deviation universities where corruption was lower than 
the norm. The approach reveals that positive deviations are possible in otherwise 
adverse situations, and also that all poorly performing universities may not be able to 
replicate the processes in the better performing ones because the drivers and types of 
corruption are different in different types of universities. It is important for policy to 
take account of these differences. Very different strategies may have to be followed in 
the less well-performing universities that cannot replicate the best performers, and these 
lagging universities may well be very numerous if not the majority.  
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4. Characteristics of Universities Selected for Analysis  
Table 3 summarizes some of the characteristics of the six universities selected for 
analysis and classifies them in terms of the subjective assessments of our respondents 
on the prevalence of corruption in their processes of recruitment and appointments. 
Two of our universities had low to intermediate levels of corruption, but the other four 
displayed much higher levels of corruption. While the ratio of corrupt to less corrupt 
universities in our sample is not necessarily representative of the population of 
universities, the broader evidence of widespread corruption in the sector and the 
responses of experts consulted in our Focus Group suggests that many if not most 
universities in Vietnam had significant levels of corruption in recruitment and 
appointments processes and the occasional ‘positive deviations’ were relatively rare.  
 
The better-performing universities appear to have benefited from better leadership, and 
leaders in these universities appear to have instituted transparent procedures for 
recruitment and appointments, though not necessarily high levels of formality. It may 
therefore appear that the standard recommendations of transparency and clarity of rules 
can contribute to a significant reduction in corruption. While transparency and 
simplicity of rules can clearly help, a more detailed examination of all our cases shows 
that the reality is more complex. A deeper analysis is able to explain why similar 
procedures do not emerge in many more universities, and it also identifies types of 
universities where such initiatives may have some traction.  
 
Our first university has the lowest reported level of corruption and we describe it as 
having a ‘Transparent Rule-Following Model’ of recruitment and appointments. This 
is one of the two ‘positive deviations’ in our sample of universities shown in Table 3. 
The positive deviations demonstrate that it is possible to achieve low levels of 
corruption within the existing legal and political structures of Vietnam. Some of the 
characteristics of this university are not surprising given the observation of transparent 
procedures in recruitment. It is a leading university located in the South, with a 
reputation for being one of the best universities in its field. It is directly supervised by 
the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET), and is one of the universities formally 
granted full autonomy, though it still receives transfers from the state budget.  
 
Recruitments and appointments in this university are based not only on transparent 
criteria, but also on formal criteria, and there is limited use of informal processes. The 
university successfully institutionalized a formal system where recruitment, 
appointments and rewards are related to transparent criteria of performance. The 
achievement of rule-following behaviour in recruitments and appointments was based 
on the development of a transparent scoring system for making these decisions. Staff 
are regularly evaluated for performance and bonuses and increments are based on these 
evaluations. Management positions are not particularly attractive in terms of access to 
rents as managers are also evaluated and have to perform. As a result, there are fewer 
managers compared to other universities, and these positions do not confer significant 
rents as higher rewards are related to better performance and greater responsibilities.  
 
Leadership was clearly important in achieving these rules-based outcomes, particularly 
since many weaker members of staff felt they would be disadvantaged under a 
performance-oriented system. One interviewee suggested that as many as forty percent 
of staff were initially not happy with the competitive performance-oriented system that 
has emerged. Clearly, weaker members of staff feel threatened, and the success of the 
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experiment depended on a critical minimum number of staff feeling that it was in their 
interest to support a results-oriented system. The initial distribution of staff capabilities 
can therefore critically determine the degree of support or resistance faced by a 
performance-based strategy of recruitment and appointments. This turns out to be one 
of a number of critical conditions for the successful formalization of recruitment and 
appointment processes.  
 
Table 3 Summary Characteristics of Selected Universities 
Low Corruption  Low to Intermediate Corruption  Higher Corruption  
University 1. 
Transparent Rule-
Following Model. 
Leading university with 
strong reputation, under 
MOET and with 
growing own revenues. 
Successfully following 
formal rule-following 
processes. 
University 2. Enterprise 
Model. Moderate-quality 
teaching university with 
financial autonomy and 
substantial own revenues 
from teaching large 
numbers of students. Not 
under MOET. High levels 
of informality but low to 
intermediate corruption. 
Minor instances of political 
corruption.  
University 3. Blind Bidding Model. 
Leading university with strong reputation 
under MOET. Substantial own revenues 
but with poor internal transparency 
resulting in ‘blind bidding’ auctions for 
positions. Corruption distorts formal rules: 
Primarily state-constraining corruption.   
University 4.  Centralized Corruption 
Model. Moderate-quality university, not 
under MOET, dependent on budgetary 
transfers. Substantial violations of formal 
rules, limited transparency and centralized 
rent collection. Responsive to external 
power centres. State-constraining 
corruption with some political corruption   
University 5. Political Faction-Driven 
Model. Leading university with strong 
reputation, under MOET. Recruitment and 
appointments strategy of university leaders 
based on developing and supporting their 
factions. Political corruption with some 
state-constraining corruption  
University 6. Flea Market Model. Lower-
quality university, not under MOET, with 
limited own revenues. Teaching contracts 
sold in exploitative ‘flea market’. Primarily 
predatory corruption with some state-
constraining corruption 
Source: Authors, for more details see Appendix Table  
 
The second university in our list has low to intermediate levels of corruption in 
recruitment and appointments. We describe it as an ‘Enterprise Model’ of university 
management. While the university does not have a high reputation for teaching or 
research, it teaches large numbers of technical courses in a professional business-like 
way. Unlike the first case, it does not have the same degree of formality in the use of 
rules, and uses considerable informal vetting and negotiations. Nevertheless, the 
informal processes here are relatively transparent and are used to identify potential 
applicants. It is also not directly under MOET supervision but comes under a separate 
ministry that it directly serves. It provides technical programmes that are particularly 
relevant for this ministry and services large numbers of students (almost fifty percent 
more than University 1) with only a slightly higher number of teachers (see the 
Appendix Table for detailed university characteristics). The quality of teaching and 
research is considerably lower than in University 1 and the business model is one of 
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intensive teaching, applied research commissioned by the supervisory ministry and 
relatively little pure academic research. Student demand for courses is high because 
they are technical courses and this generates significant revenues, but not enough 
surpluses (rents) to make jobs in the university particularly attractive. Thus, this 
university has very different academic and economic characteristics compared to 
University 1. 
 
Its enterprise-based management system dates back to the days when it was part of a 
corporation under its supervisory Ministry. Key Performance Indicators (KPI) were 
introduced, which allowed the organization’s objectives to be specified in clear and 
measurable ways. To achieve these objectives different types of academics are 
recruited, a few research-active academics, a few intermediate ones with some capacity 
to publish, and many with only a Master degree who mainly teach. Although the 
research-active academics earn a higher salary than the others, most of these jobs do 
not entail any significant rents because the reputation of the university is low and 
salaries are higher in other universities with a better reputation, or in other jobs in the 
same ministry. This is demonstrated by the fact that the university gets very few 
applications when recruitments are advertised, and the leadership has to engage in 
significant informal head-hunting to identify candidates and to persuade them to apply. 
The low demand for positions in this university and the virtual absence of rents for new 
recruits ensures that the possibility of extracting bribes from applicants is low.  
 
Administrative appointments in this university faces similar constraints. The rewards 
in administrative positions are related to the achievement of KPIs and this can involve 
hard work and getting the support of other academics. An informal process is used to 
identify candidates, and here too there is usually a problem of low demand for these 
positions and therefore few opportunities to extract bribes during the appointments 
process. However, our respondents identify some possible areas of corruption in this 
university. These include the practice of occasionally providing sinecures to senior 
officials from the ministry who are given administrative positions without adequate 
qualifications or competition. For older individuals from distant provinces, a sinecure 
in the capital as a university administrator can be an attractive position at a certain age, 
and there are some indications that corruption may be involved in the recruitment and 
appointment of such individuals. This ‘political’ corruption arguably contributes to 
maintaining good external relationships with the ministry.  
 
The four other cases are ones of considerably higher levels of corruption. We describe 
the system of corruption in University 3 as a ‘Blind Bidding Model’. The 
characteristics of this university provide an apparent paradox because it is a university 
which still has a high reputation in teaching and research, its academics are highly paid, 
and yet corruption in recruitment and appointments appears to be widespread. In our 
assessment the quality of the teaching staff in this university was higher than in the first 
university, and the research quality was at least as good (see Appendix Table). As a 
result of its superior performance, the average income of university staff was reported 
to be about 11 MVND/month higher in 2014 compared to most other universities. Yet 
our respondents report widespread corruption in appointments, and the corruption 
appears to take the very inefficient form of blind bidding. Academics seek positions by 
means of gifting cash or presents, or providing time and effort to support the leadership 
in order to get particular positions. But these investments are ‘blind’ in that individuals 
do not know the ‘bids’ of others, and therefore do not know if they will get the position 
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they are aspiring to. As the outcomes of these bids are uncertain, this has the expected 
negative effect on morale and also occasionally creates obligations on the part of the 
leadership to create new posts to accommodate bidders who could not be satisfied in 
one round.  
 
The university is directly supervised by MOET, which implies that the formal 
supervisory arrangements of MOET are insufficient for preventing the violation of 
formal rules, or that the supervisory links may indeed sometimes be part of the problem. 
The university also has significant internal revenues from teaching and research, and 
this too is similar to some of the conditions in the universities with lower corruption 
described earlier. Internal revenues should create incentives for maintaining the quality 
of teaching and research, but it appears that constraining corruption is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to maintain standards. The university appears to maintain high standards 
while engaging in substantial internal corruption in appointments. This could be a short-
term phenomenon, and indeed the low morale and criticisms of insiders suggests that 
there may be negative longer-term effects of selecting inappropriate people for 
leadership positions within the university. The significant difference in this case from 
the two previous examples is that this university had very little internal transparency 
and its leadership could regularly violate formal procedures. 
 
University 3 is similar to University 1 but different from University 2, in that there is 
excess demand for positions because of the university’s reputation and the flow of 
internal revenues gives administrative post-holders access to potential rents. The excess 
demand for positions in turn potentially enables the sale of offices. The formal 
processes of appointment are very similar to those in less corrupt universities. However, 
the formal rules only ensure that applicants who are below a minimum standard are not 
appointed. But this is not the same as appointing the best person. Job specifications can 
be calibrated to ensure particular individuals have an advantage. Some individuals may 
also be informally encouraged to ‘run’ for particular positions, which requires giving 
gifts to the leader and making sure that the leader is supported in other administrative 
and policy matters. Over time, there has been a transition from a practice of bidding 
with money and gifts to one of bidding by committing time and loyalty to leadership 
projects.  
 
There is no guarantee that investments of time and money will pay off and this can 
result in disappointed candidates. The fact that the leadership cannot ensure the 
recruitment or appointment of particular individuals suggests the leadership has to work 
through the consent of intermediate levels who sometimes do not agree with the leader 
or with each other. Failed bidders can sometimes be satisfied with promises of 
prioritization in the future. But some disappointed candidates openly criticize the 
system, and this results in growing cynicism towards the leadership and a loss of 
morale. These effects on staff quality and morale mean that it is unlikely that Blind 
Bidding is a sustainable model for a high-quality university. The university is likely to 
either suffer a loss of staff quality and reputation over time or move towards more 
effective and transparent recruitment and appointments procedures. The danger is that 
if overall staff capabilities deteriorate as a result of these current recruitment and 
appointment practices, there may eventually be insufficient support for a results-based 
system of evaluation, promotion and appointment, as the latter may then be resisted by 
a majority of the staff. A likely trajectory, if that were to happen, may then be a move 
either towards the political faction model or the centralized corruption model, both of 
20 
 
which are discussed later. In the political faction model jobs depend on loyalty to 
factions that are competing for dominance, while in the centralized corruption model, 
there the head is more firmly in power and there is greater certainly about the results of 
corruption.  
 
Our fourth university is an example of a ‘Centralized Corruption Model’. Here the 
leadership has the power to determine the allocation of jobs, and intermediate levels of 
management are relatively weak. Decisions and negotiations typically involve the 
Director of the university. The university comes under a separate ministry and provides 
training to officials primarily in areas related to the functions of that ministry. It is not 
particularly well-known and does not have a strong reputation. It does, however, have 
a very large number of students, almost twice the number of students compared to our 
first university. More than sixty percent of its budget comes from the state budget for 
providing teaching. It has a much more limited flow of own revenues from specialized 
classes. The corruption here is quite similar to the Blind Bidding model, except that the 
corruption is organized more centrally and the rents going to intermediate levels of 
management are much lower.  
 
The head of the university determines areas of expansion and has a determining voice 
in recruitment and appointments. Once the head decides that a particular person should 
be recruited or appointed to an administrative position, this is usually implemented by 
the appropriate committees. Opposing the leadership is not a viable strategy for middle 
management, and this allows leadership decisions to be rubber-stamped. A structure of 
rates for bribes also exists. When powerful outsiders request jobs for their family 
members or clients, these ‘political’ requests are generally considered favourably and 
the individuals linked to powerful outsiders do not have to pay any bribes. This feature 
is critical because the power of the Director to act in a centralized way is likely to be 
related to the fact that the Director is responsive to the requests of powerful outsiders. 
Family members of existing staff have to pay bribes but at a lower rate. Finally, other 
individuals introduced by existing staff or approaching the Director on their own pay 
the highest rates of bribes. 
 
Even though the university does not have a high reputation, and middle management 
does not have much autonomy to capture rents, there is excess demand for both ordinary 
academic positions and appointments to management positions. It has a very stable flow 
of budgetary funds, and the political importance and connections of the university 
means that these flows are secure. Academic jobs are not very demanding and carry a 
high level of security, and can also lead to potential external appointments. Middle 
management positions can also be seen as a stepping stone to higher positions where 
there are greater rent capture opportunities. The Director in this university has more 
cohesive and centralized decision-making powers. This implies that the Director has 
strong external support to stay in power and does not require internal support to the 
same extent. In turn this implies that university autonomy is more limited in this case. 
One consequence is that there is greater certainty about investments in corruption in 
this case compared to the Blind Bidding model, because bidders are negotiating with a 
single person. If the Director is unable to accommodate a bidder, there is evidence that 
‘investments’ can be refunded. On the other hand, the greater transparency about these 
processes has an even more corrosive effect on morale and morals over time.  
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In the fifth university, the explicitly political aspects of the corruption processes are 
even more important and we describe this as the ‘Political Faction-Driven Model’. 
Here, there is a mutual set of interests between leaders and academics to construct and 
operate factions. A faction in this context is a network of academics, administrators and 
external supporters who act collectively (in an informal way) to capture and distribute 
rents within the network. Aspiring academics and administrative position-holders are 
more likely to get attractive positions in the organization if they identify with and 
establish their loyalty towards particular factions. On their part, the authority of leaders 
and their ability to mobilize support for their ambitions inside and outside the university 
depends on the effectiveness of the factions they can construct. This can quickly result 
in intensely factionalized universities with bitter conflicts between competing factions. 
Factionalism implies that the faction currently in power is not assured of remaining 
there. If the likelihood of that was high, this would be similar to the centralized 
corruption model. Paradoxically, therefore, the faction-driven model is more likely 
when universities have a higher level of autonomy, and different groups compete to 
gain control of internal decision-making positions.  
 
This university is located in the South and is supervised by MOET. It has an excellent 
reputation as a university specializing in particular types of professional training, and 
is recognized as one of the top universities in the South. It has a high quality teaching 
staff and has additional teaching programmes that give it substantial revenue streams 
outside the official budget. Clearly, minimum standards in recruitments and 
appointments are being met as the university is doing well, but in fact it is also riven 
with internal factions and conflicts. Advancement requires belonging to and 
establishing loyalty towards the dominant faction (or waiting for your faction to become 
the dominant faction). Those who are excluded because their faction is not in favour 
have little chance of making progress. If enough individuals are included in the 
dominant faction, their support for the system on the basis of their own interests can 
create a powerful force in favour of the status quo and make reform very difficult.  
 
From the perspective of the leadership, organizing and favouring their own factions is 
also an effective strategy for developing political power that can be used for bargaining 
for rents both inside and outside the university. Leaders who have big factions 
supporting them can be secure in their positions and are also credible as university 
managers to outside political and supervisory agencies. This enhances their own 
bargaining power to remain in leadership positions and also to bargain for resources for 
their university. The support of a large group can also be mobilized by university 
leaders for ambitions that go beyond the university. Some years ago a Director of the 
university had an opportunity to compete for a high office in Hanoi. He was able to 
mobilize his faction within the university to actively campaign for him using all their 
individual contacts, including meeting important people, organizing bribes and payoffs 
and so on. The appointment of the Director to an external office would allow the entire 
faction to move on, so the logic of developing these networks is not limited to rent-
seeking activities within the university. While the faction-driven model has a strong 
logic, the negative implications for university operations are obvious. Apart from the 
intense conflicts that are periodically unleashed, the best people are not promoted or 
put into administrative positions, with an inevitable impact on quality over time. 
 
In all of the last three cases, ‘political’ networks play an important role in organizing 
and sustaining corrupt practices in different ways. In the Centralized Corruption model, 
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the head has centralized power within the organization to make decisions and is less 
reliant on internal networks. This is sustainable if the head has powerful linkages with 
external political networks and as a result is not significantly dependent on internal 
support. Such a university is likely to lack any real autonomy. In the Factional Politics-
Driven model the head has some external political support but also requires internal 
support. The head’s position, and that of the currently dominant faction, is not entirely 
secure, and this generates internal factional loyalties and factional competition. This 
type of university is more likely to have a higher degree of effective autonomy than the 
centralized corruption model. The Blind Bidding model is somewhere in between. The 
head is powerful but works through trusted lieutenants who approach individuals and 
urge them to start competing for particular positions. The head cannot always deliver, 
and this indicates the limited power of the head. The fact that the head needs to operate 
through lieutenants and encourage blind bidding rather than direct negotiation is also 
compatible with the more constrained power of the head that makes the head operate 
through intermediaries who are likely to also influence the outcome. The Blind Bidding 
model is therefore more fluid and less stable than the other two, and is likely to evolve 
towards one of the other two models. Each model has negative implications for the 
career prospects of high quality individuals within these universities who may be left 
behind for different reasons in each case.  
 
Our sixth and final university is a predatory model of exploitation, which we describe 
as a ‘Flea Market’. The rents captured by university management appear to largely 
come from exploiting temporary teaching staff in this large general purpose teaching-
intensive university with relatively low academic standards. This case has elements of 
predatory corruption and a worrying failure of oversight and supervision. The 
university is not supervised by MOET but by a ministry to which it provides some 
specialist training. Only thirty percent of its budget comes from budgetary transfers but 
its own revenue stream largely comes from mass teaching programmes catering to 
students at the lower end of qualifications who are not able to get into better universities 
with a higher reputation. The quality of the teaching staff in terms of teaching 
qualifications and research output is the lowest in our sample of universities (see 
Appendix Table).  
 
The exploitative aspects of corruption in this university are that almost all recruitment 
and administrative positions appear to be for sale, and at prices that are quite high given 
the particularly low levels of salaries in this university. The university makes decisions 
on new appointments and recruitment in a non-transparent way and then intermediaries 
make it known that positions are available. The bribe for getting an initial teaching 
contract can be upwards of four to seven times the monthly salary, and administrative 
positions are more expensive. The aspirant is introduced to senior decision-makers and 
the payments are split across several key managers. Occasionally applications are 
unsuccessful (for instance because of changes in senior management) and in these cases 
there is some evidence that part at least of the investment is returned, but this does not 
happen in every case. After some time, the temporary teaching contracts are upgraded 
to permanent positions after passing a series of exams, but this is a formality as the 
payments have already been made.  
 
The attractiveness of low-paid teaching jobs in a university with a low academic 
reputation appears to be a puzzle, but it is easily explained. There are large numbers of 
graduates in Vietnam whose Masters degrees are not good enough for jobs in better 
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universities and who for various reasons (including being female or preferring a job 
with flexible hours and little competition) are willing to buy themselves such safe jobs 
with limited subsequent competition. The supply of a large pool of potential jobseekers 
with limited qualifications and aspirations creates an excess demand for this particular 
category of academic jobs. This allows the emergence of predatory corruption where 
extortion can be exercised on relatively low-paid teaching staff. At the same time, there 
are clearly internal ‘political’ networks within the university as the rents collected are 
shared with a series of intermediaries. The consequences are, as expected, very severe 
on staff morale and on incentives for the teaching staff to improve the quality of 
teaching and research. A particularly irksome problem for staff is that a change of 
leadership in the form of a new Dean, for example, can bring in a leader who is 
antagonistic to the appointments and bribes collected by the last Dean. This can result 
in an implicit demand for new bribes to satisfy the current leadership. Staff who refuse 
or are unable to do so can suffer from extra workloads and other forms of harassment.  
 
5. Characteristics of Corruption Processes in the Six Universities  
The variations in characteristics and types of corruption observed in our six universities 
show that a simple explanatory model will not suffice to explain the prevalence of 
corruption even in the narrowly delimited area of university activities. In terms of the 
types of corruption outlined in Section 2, we find limited evidence in our case studies 
of corruption that can be classified as responses to inefficient or ‘market-restricting’ 
regulations. This type of corruption is triggered by regulations and procedures that are 
so complex or dysfunctional that even socially desirable resource allocation by agents 
becomes very difficult and corruption emerges as a second-best response. In these 
cases, anti-corruption strategy has to focus on simplifying the regulatory structure and 
making it more appropriate for achieving the objectives of the regulation. This does not 
mean that the regulatory structure facing Vietnamese universities is effective enough 
and cannot be improved. The regulatory structure is far too complex, with different 
supervisory bodies and a dual system of approvals involving both university 
administrations and the parallel structures of the Communist Party. These procedures 
could well be streamlined and simplified. However, we did not find significant 
examples of corruption that were directly a response to this complexity by applicants 
or universities attempting to by-pass unnecessary restrictions.  
 
Most of the damaging types of corruption in our case studies were of the state-
constraining variety where the corruption distorted and violated necessary regulations 
in order to capture rents. Clear procedures were violated either in spirit or in substance 
in these cases. The state either did not have the capacity to identify and stop these 
practices or regulators did not intend to stop anything. There was also evidence of 
political corruption in some universities as ‘political’ networks were used to maintain 
bargaining power and to distribute rents and jobs. Political corruption usually operates 
simultaneously with state-constraining corruption and this means that the viability of 
anti-corruption strategies is likely to depend on identifying the types of political 
networks at play and having policies that can work around these networks or that can 
weaken the networks themselves.  
 
In the cases of state-constraining corruption, the managements of universities were 
violating rules by selling positions with rents to the highest bidders. Clearly, at one 
level, the answer to state-constraining corruption is the enforcement of rules-based 
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recruitments, promotions and appointments. This in turn requires monitoring and 
enforcement capabilities both within universities and by external regulators. A deeper 
question is whether such reforms would be implementable in most of these universities. 
The persistence of corruption in so many universities and positive deviations in so very 
few cases suggests that we should look for processes that may be blocking reform-
minded leaderships from taking over in universities suffering from corruption. We 
argue that this is indeed the case and with a few exceptions, most universities with 
corruption not only have leaderships that are driving corruption, but also large groups 
of victims who are reluctantly colluding for different sets of reasons. It is these reasons 
that we need to identify for effective anti-corruption policy.  
 
Finally, predatory corruption also exists in some universities and is particularly serious 
in University 6. Predatory corruption is characterized by the extraction of revenue from 
individuals who have low bargaining power. The distinction here is that predatory 
corruption is not based on collusion between the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker to share 
rents, but is rather based on the capacity of the leadership and the management team to 
push wages below the market rate because of an excess supply problem. Here, the 
emergence of effective anti-corruption strategies requires addressing the problem of 
excess supply that results in the poor bargaining power of applicants, and if this cannot 
be achieved, to mitigate the problem with specific oversight and monitoring 
arrangements. The next step in our analysis is to identify the factors that may be driving 
different types of corruption processes in different universities. A satisfactory analysis 
of corruption in recruitment and appointments has to be consistent with at least the 
following characteristics that emerge from our case studies.  
 
First, the supervisory agency does not appear to be decisive in determining the presence 
or absence of corruption but some regulatory functions are critical. Of the two 
universities that had low levels of corruption, one was under the Ministry of Education 
and Training (MOET), and one was not. Similarly, two of the universities where 
significant levels of corruption were observed were under MOET, and two were under 
other ministries. Thus, it is not the case that universities under ministries other than 
MOET are subject to higher levels of non-academic recruitment pressures. Moreover, 
as the same regulatory structure is associated with different outcomes depending on the 
university, the somewhat reassuring implication is that success in anti-corruption does 
not have to wait till a much more effective regulatory and enforcement structure has 
emerged. Some Vietnamese universities have achieved much lower levels of corruption 
within the existing regulatory structure. On the other hand, some of the more damaging 
types of corruption, like predatory corruption, were associated with weak oversight and 
regulation in universities that were structurally vulnerable to this type of corruption.  
 
Secondly, there does not appear to be any simple correspondence between the extent 
of adherence to formal rules in a university and the prevalence of corruption. 
University 1 achieved a high level of adherence to formal rules but University 2, which 
also had relatively low levels of corruption, used informal practices to a greater extent 
in its recruitment activities, given its specific recruitment problems. The four 
universities with higher levels of corruption all had significant formal rule violations 
and therefore necessarily violated formal rules to a greater extent and implicitly used 
‘informal’ processes. The possibility that low-corruption universities may also engage 
in informal processes is not surprising given the social context of inadequate 
formalization of rules and the high transaction costs of operating formal processes in 
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developing countries. But clearly, anti-corruption strategies do not have to address all 
types of informality in order to be effective.  
 
Thirdly, while there is no simple correlation between the share of budgetary funding 
for a university and the prevalence of corruption, there appears to be a conditional 
relationship. The two best universities had very low levels of budgetary support. They 
generated a significant share of their revenue streams themselves, primarily through 
their own training programmes. However, University 3 also had a very low share of 
budgetary support and yet operated a Blind Bidding Model of corruption. On the other 
hand, two of the higher corruption universities (4 and 6) had higher shares of state 
support, as did University 5, though we do not have a numerical figure for the share of 
state support to the last university (see Appendix table). This evidence suggests that 
having significant own revenues is likely to be helpful but is not sufficient for the 
achievement of low corruption in recruitment and appointments. Other factors clearly 
also matter, including in particular, the types of political linkages between the 
university and external supervisory bodies and ministries. 
 
Having own revenues may be helpful if the sources are such that they create incentives 
for the university to ensure recruitment and appointments in line with the requirements 
of providing these revenue-generating services. Getting the best staff to ensure these 
revenue flows over time may require constraining short-term corruption in selling 
positions. These universities are also likely to have the internal resources to reward staff 
in line with the provision of these services. But own revenues may not be sufficient 
because internal networks could still coordinate the sale of offices as we see in the case 
of University 3. On the other hand, significant internal revenues may not be necessary 
for achieving low corruption. In principle, state transfers could also be linked to 
measurable teaching and research outcomes. If budgetary revenue are credibly linked 
to teaching and research outcomes, universities will have incentives to constrain 
corruption in recruitment and appointments to ensure their long-term flows of funds. 
Non-budgetary sources of income only become important for constraining corruption 
in contexts where the objectives, capabilities or incentives of the supervisory bodies 
responsible for linking budgetary transfers to teaching and research outcomes are 
questionable. However, full financial autonomy is not likely to be a feasible strategy 
for most Vietnamese universities, and indeed budgetary support for universities is 
common in many advanced countries. As a result, credibly improving the linkages 
between budgetary support to universities and their teaching and research outcomes is 
an important policy priority.  
  
Fourth, while there is no simple correlation between the quality of research and 
teaching and the prevalence of corruption, there appears to be a more complex 
relationship that has cumulative and reinforcing effects. University 1 with low 
corruption did have high quality teaching and research. But University 2, also with 
relatively low corruption, had somewhat lower teaching and research quality. Of the 
universities with significant corruption, some had high quality teaching and research 
(Universities 3 and 5), some achieved moderate quality (University 4), and some had 
poor standards (University 6). While there is no simple relationship, a high proportion 
of high-capability staff (or staff whose capabilities are aligned with the teaching and 
research objectives of the university) is likely to be strongly supportive of anti-
corruption strategies. This is because staff whose capabilities are aligned with 
university goals are more likely to support transparent rules for recruitment and 
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appointments as these rules will not be threatening to their interests and prospects. The 
mix of capabilities within the staff body could therefore play a significant role in 
determining support for reforms. Indeed, our two low-corruption universities had 
relatively high teaching and research capabilities. But high staff capabilities are not 
sufficient to achieve low corruption, as we can see in some of our other universities. 
High capability staff cannot on their own ensure the emergence of a rule-following 
process of appointments without other supporting factors, including a forward-looking 
leadership and the absence of damaging ‘political’ networks within the university. The 
most important observation is that staff quality and the presence or absence of 
corruption can have significant reinforcing effects over time. If there is corruption in 
recruitment, it is likely that average staff capabilities will decline over time, and 
opportunities for reform may therefore decline even in universities that are performing 
well at the moment. However, even in universities with significant corruption, there 
may be a floor below which the leadership will not allow the quality of staff to fall, 
because they have to maintain some level of reputation in teaching and research. But 
the average quality may become too low in many universities to sustain support for 
reform in the direction of transparent rules-based recruitment, promotion and 
administrative appointments.  
 
Finally, our case studies show the critical importance of the types of ‘political’ networks 
within particular universities in determining the types of corruption that are prevalent. 
Corruption in recruitment and appointments cannot happen without the involvement or 
at least the knowledge of a number of people. These internal networks and networks 
with groups outside the university are important for understanding the variations in the 
types of corruption that we observe. In the Centralized Corruption Model (University 
4), the network operating within the university is dominated by the Director, who has 
strong political links with power centres outside the university. This allows the Director 
to effectively make most of the decisions on recruitments and appointments and capture 
most of the rents. A part of the takings is undoubtedly shared with the senior staff who 
are involved in validating and implementing these decisions, but the balance in this 
university is tilted towards the chief. The ‘political’ ability of the chief to protect his or 
her position and exercise centralized power within the organization is very likely related 
to the types of external networks as discussed earlier. We know that University 4 was 
particularly receptive to requests for recruitment coming from its Ministry and there 
may be other forms of rent-sharing with external networks that sustains the power of 
the Director.  
 
In all the other universities with corruption, the internal networks are somewhat flatter, 
with a greater proportion of rents being shared within the internal networks involving 
senior staff, and a somewhat greater involvement of these staff in decisions on 
recruitment and appointments. Generally, this indicates a greater dependence of the 
head on support within the organization. This was most marked in University 5, the 
Faction-Driven Corruption Model but we also see moves in this direction in University 
3, the Blind Bidding Model where the leadership is increasingly moving away from 
demanding bribes and instead demanding loyalty to their networks. This tendency is 
reinforced if the average quality of staff declines and many staff have to join networks 
to protect their positions. In this sense, the long-term trajectory of University 3 may be 
in the direction of the Faction-Driven Corruption of University 5, if it fails to move 
rapidly towards the Rule-Following model of University 1. 
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6. Analysis of Corruption Processes in Recruitment and Appointments  
Some of the drivers of corruption in the education sector are well-known because they 
are the same as the drivers of corruption in every sector. Complex rules and supervisory 
structures combined with weak monitoring and enforcement capabilities of a state are 
the background conditions that affect all types of corruption in developing countries. 
The importance of leadership quality both within organizations and in the state is also 
widely recognized in the literature on corruption and anti-corruption. However, in 
addition there are some specific drivers of corruption that are sector-specific and affect 
different types of organizations differently. We are now in a position to analytically 
outline some of the processes affecting recruitment and appointments in the Vietnamese 
university sector that could explain some of the variations in corruption outcomes 
observed across universities.  
 
Revenue Sources  
The feasibility of a rules-based system of recruitment and appointments can be 
significantly affected by the sources of revenue that the university has access to, and 
the conditions it has to fulfil in order to access these revenues. Based on our case 
studies, Figure 2 outlines how variations in the magnitude of revenue available to the 
university and the terms on which it can access these revenues could affect the 
feasibility of rules-based recruitment and appointments processes relative to processes 
of faction-building and appointments based on factional loyalty. Moreover, both rules-
based and factional-politics based strategies can become locked in through feedbacks 
from the quality of appointments that reinforce particular sources of revenues.  
 
The logic is as follows. Universities that have greater access to performance-based 
revenues are shown further on the left hand side of the range of sources of revenue in 
Figure 2. It does not matter whether these revenues come from the state budget or 
internal sources of revenue. What matters is whether the revenue flows are dependent 
on performance or not. When revenues depend on assessments of performance (either 
by fee-paying students or state regulators releasing funds according to formula), the 
university has an incentive to ensure that staff quality and leadership are aligned with 
these objectives. In particular, if the revenue stream is also sufficient to reward staff 
who are contributing to performance, the emergence of a rules-based staff recruitment 
and evaluation system becomes feasible, as does the appointment of effective managers 
to senior management positions. Lower down the diagram, we see that this strategy has 
feedback effects that can ‘lock in’ such a strategy. Improvements in staff appointments 
make it easier to achieve performance-related goals, enhancing revenue streams and so 
on in a virtuous cycle. 
 
In contrast, the right hand side of the range of revenue sources in Figure 2 shows 
universities where additional revenue flows depend on the political capability of the 
leadership to bargain for incremental funds. This bargaining can be about permissions 
to set up new courses, to recruit additional students and so on. When the incremental 
revenue flows from lobbying are more important than from improving performance, 
lobbying skills and political connections become more important for the university. In 
addition, if the incremental revenue flows to the university are also limited, it is not 
possible to provide incremental performance-related rewards to all staff. If either or 
both of these conditions hold, the recruitment and appointments process is likely to be 
characterized by strategies of job-creation for those who belong to or are willing to join 
factions supporting the leadership. A leadership with limited resources and dependent 
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on political lobbying is likely to develop factions as a rational strategy to consolidate 
authority based on loyalty and also to use these political networks to lobby outside the 
university. The lower part of the diagram shows that when faction-based employment 
strategies reach a certain point these strategies can also get ‘locked in’ as the university 
becomes more specialized in getting lobbying-based revenues.  
 
 
Different types of 
networks (centralized, 
factional etc)
High quality staff and 
management 
appointed 
Sources and magnitude of revenues available to the university 
Revenue flow based on 
performance in teaching 
and/or research 
Revenue flow based on 
lobbying and political 
connections 
Revenues insufficient to 
reward all staff 
contributing to 
performance 
Revenues sufficient to 
reward all staff 
contributing to 
performance 
Range of variation in revenue sources and terms 
AND/ORAND
Rules-based 
recruitment and 
appointments feasible 
Factional rent-
allocation and loyalty-
based recruitment and 
appointment 
Range of variation from rules-based to corrupt processes 
of recruitments and appointments 
Strengthening of networks 
reinforces lobbying-based 
revenue flows
Improvement in performance 
reinforces performance-related 
revenue flows
 
 
Figure 2 Revenue Sources and Processes of Corruption 
 
As there are a number of overlapping factors affecting the emergence of corruption in 
recruitment and appointments in different universities, the process driven by the 
revenue variable in Figure 2 does not on its own provide a deterministic explanation of 
the degree of corruption in particular universities. Rather, it is one important variable 
amongst a number of variables that can affect the type of process that is likely to emerge 
as an outcome. The outcomes can range from rule-following recruitment and 
appointments to recruitment and appointments according to different factional logics, 
which are inevitably corrupt processes. As these outcomes define a range, the actual 
process in a particular university can be a mix of rule-following and corrupt processes. 
The process actually observed in a particular university is also likely to depend on other 
factors affecting outcomes, some of which are discussed below. 
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Staff Capabilities  
Another variable that appears to affect processes of recruitment and appointments is the 
mix of staff capabilities relative to the formal requirements of the university. Staff 
capabilities refers not just to the quality of degrees and qualifications, but also to the 
capacity of the staff to adapt to and cope with the university’s teaching and research 
objectives. The logic, derived from our case studies, is as follows. If staff capabilities 
are aligned with formal university objectives, a rules-based system of staff evaluation 
and rewards will not be perceived by staff as being against their interests. In contrast, 
if a significant number of staff do not have the capabilities to meet the formal objectives 
of the university, there may be considerable support for procedures that violate rules 
and protect existing staff. This is likely to lead to support for factional politics and 
loyalties to particular leaders. Moreover, in these contexts, recruitment and 
appointments processes that strengthen factions are likely to find considerable support, 
and these processes inevitably involve corruption. The effects of the distribution of 
capabilities on processes of recruitment and appointment are summarized in Figure 3. 
 
 
Mix of capabilities in existing staff
Staff have capabilities 
aligned with university 
objectives 
Staff do not have 
capabilities aligned with 
university objectives 
Staff support corruption 
and factional politics in 
recruitment and 
appointments 
Staff support rules-
based recruitment and 
appointments 
Range of variation in levels of support for rules-based systems 
Range of variation in capabilities 
 
 
Figure 3 Staff Capabilities and Processes of Corruption 
 
As in Figure 2, here too there are likely to be feedback effects, particularly at the 
extreme ends of the left to right spectrum, with rules-based recruitment strengthening 
staff quality over time and faction-driven appointments resulting in a deterioration of 
quality. For the sake of simplifying the diagrams we do not include these feedback 
effects in Figure 3. We have to see the drivers in Figure 2 and Figure 3 as overlapping 
ones. The effects of inadequate revenues can to some extent be offset by a high degree 
of alignment of staff capabilities with university objectives, or the two drivers can 
reinforce each other to support either rule-following or corrupt processes. From a policy 
perspective, the revenue problem may be more difficult to address, even though it is an 
important problem that has to be addressed if corruption in universities is to be 
significantly reduced. In contrast, the alignment of staff capabilities with university 
objectives could be easier to address. Although the distribution of actual staff 
capabilities can take a long time to change, an alignment between existing capabilities 
and university objectives can be more quickly achieved by defining current objectives 
in line with what the university can actually deliver. For instance, in universities 
catering to students with low levels of initial qualifications and where the staff 
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themselves have intermediate levels of qualifications, university objectives can be 
aligned with staff capabilities by recognizing that in this university staff should be 
assessed by the value they add to disadvantaged students. The implication is that staff 
will be selected, rewarded and promoted in terms of the enhancement of student quality 
(or value added to the students) that they achieve, which can be measured by the 
improvement in student performance between joining and leaving particular courses. 
In contrast, if formal staff evaluations in such a university gave a high weight to 
research, measured by the numbers of publications in international peer-reviewed 
journals, the lack of alignment of evaluation objectives with staff capabilities can create 
incentives for factional politics and corruption.  
 
Excess Supply of Applicants and Predatory Corruption  
An important variable affecting corrupt outcomes in our case studies is the supply of 
applicants competing for available places. Given the weakness of regulatory and 
supervisory structures, an excess supply of applicants can lead to predatory exploitation 
of applicants. The excess supply of applicants can be due to a number of factors. One 
factor that is potentially easy to address is to define the job specification properly. If 
academic positions are described in very general terms, a very large pool of individuals 
can be induced to apply, giving considerable discretion to selectors. However, other 
reasons may be quite specific to the country and may be difficult to fully address in the 
short term. The willingness of professionally educated individuals to travel across the 
country to take up positions is still relatively limited, and this can create an excess 
supply of applicants for university jobs in some localities where alternative 
employment opportunities are limited. The excess supply of applicants can allow 
resource extraction from job-seekers. Predatory corruption has to be distinguished both 
from the corruption driven by factional politics and the corruption driven by rent-
protecting strategies of staff whose qualifications are not aligned with university 
objectives, in the ways discussed earlier. The drivers of predatory corruption are 
summarized in Figure 4. 
 
 
Proper specification of 
academic requirements can 
reduce excess supply to 
‘normal’ levels 
Abnormal levels of excess 
supply remains even with a 
proper specification of 
requirements   
Excess supply of applicants 
Possibility of predatory 
extortion from applicants in 
the absence of additional 
monitoring arrangements 
Rules-based selection 
criteria potentially feasible 
Range of variation in possibility of 
predatory corruption 
Range of variation in excess supply 
 
 
Figure 4 Excess Supply of Applicants and Predatory Corruption 
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In some universities the academic and professional level of the required applicants may 
be so low that even a proper job specification can result in an excess supply of 
applicants. This was the case in the Flea Market Model described earlier. In such cases, 
predatory corruption can only be countered by improving the monitoring and 
enforcement capacities of supervisory bodies to prevent these practices. In general, 
predatory corruption reflects a significant breakdown in enforcement capacities of the 
state, and this is true in the education sector as well. In those universities where a 
process analysis suggests predatory corruption is likely to be a significant problem, 
additional regulatory steps have to be taken to address the problem. 
 
7. Implications for Policy  
We can now bring together our analysis of processes to see how it sheds light on the 
variations of corruption observed across our sample of six universities. An important 
result of this analysis is to show that a number of different processes are in operation in 
the corruption affecting recruitments, promotions and administrative appointments in 
different types of universities. Anti-corruption strategies can be better designed by 
taking these differences into account. The observation of low corruption in a small 
number of universities with strong leaderships and formal rules can give the impression 
that the enforcement of formal criteria for recruitment, promotion and administrative 
appointments are the main ingredients required for a substantial reduction of corruption. 
Our process analysis suggests that while strong and committed leaderships undoubtedly 
played a vital role in institutionalizing formal rules and thereby reducing corruption in 
the positive deviation cases, they were unlikely to have been successful in the absence 
of supportive underlying conditions. Similar strategies are unlikely to work on their 
own in other universities where the underlying conditions create structural tendencies 
for higher levels of corruption or different types of corruption.  
 
In many of the universities where corruption is a problem, it is important to begin with 
an analysis of the factors driving different types of processes. In these universities, other 
steps may have to be undertaken in parallel to alter some of the factors that are driving 
different types of corruption. For instance, in some universities the political networks 
linking the university to external power sources, or linking different academics and 
administrators within the university may be a significant problem. To the extent that 
these factional networks are persistent, reform may be slow, and deeper reforms may 
be necessary to undermine factions. These may include a clearer identification of 
university objectives and linking appointments and promotions to these objectives, and 
carrying out financing reforms giving universities the incentives to generate revenue in 
ways that add value in terms of teaching and education and reward the academics 
providing these services. Finally, the strengthening of regulatory capacity in some areas 
may be a critical component of anti-corruption in some cases.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the different processes affecting corruption across our sample 
universities and the implications for a broader discussion of policy. 
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Table 4 Factors Determining Corruption Processes Across Universities 
University  Key Factors Affecting 
Processes  
Policy Implications  
1. 
Transparent 
Rule-
Following 
Model 
Substantial performance-related 
revenues;  
High staff quality aligned to 
university objectives;  
Supply of applicants not excessive. 
These factors in turn allow delinking 
the university from factional politics. 
Leadership plays a critical role in ensuring 
transition to rule-following model by 
aligning evaluation and rewards with 
performance. But leadership success depends 
on supporting factors being present.  
2. Enterprise 
Model  
Substantial performance-related 
revenues; 
Moderate staff quality but aligned to 
university objectives;  
Few applicants because low rewards. 
Enterprise culture based on history 
under a particular ministry. 
Some external political networks. 
Enterprise culture important for this model, 
and may not be easy to reproduce.  
Leadership and enterprise history played a 
critical role in institutionalizing Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs).  
The main constraints to moving towards a 
full rule-following model are the low levels 
of teaching and research, and external 
political networks.  
3. Blind 
Bidding 
Model 
Some performance-related revenues;  
Staff quality aligned with objectives;  
Excess supply of applicants because 
minimum criteria set quite low.  
External political protection of 
leadership and some dependence on 
internal support. 
Rump of old-fashioned staff 
threatened by performance-based 
evaluations.  
Anomalous case because lower-corruption 
model appears to be feasible but is actually 
blocked by political protection of leadership 
as well as rump of low-capability staff.   
Policy would be to support strategies for 
improving staff quality to create constituency 
for supporting reform, and delinking 
leadership from external political connections 
before staff quality deteriorated too much. 
4. 
Centralized 
Corruption 
Model  
Low performance-related revenues;  
Staff quality moderate and not 
always aligned with university 
objectives;  
Supply of applicants not excessive. 
Leadership with strong political 
connections and not very dependent 
on internal support. 
Leadership change insufficient for reform 
without addressing external links of 
university: Government financing has to be 
linked to performance criteria. 
De-linking university from strong external 
political links also likely to be necessary. 
These changes may allow the introduction of 
performance-related appointments and 
promotions. 
5. Political 
Faction-
Driven 
Model  
As in previous case except that 
leadership is more dependent on 
internal factional support and 
dominant group faces competition 
from other factions. 
Policy implications as above except that apart 
from delinking university from external 
political connections, greater attention on 
aligning recruitment rules with university 
objectives required to reduce the incentives 
for factional organization.. 
6. Flea 
Market 
Model  
Moderate levels of performance-
related revenues;  
Poor staff quality, not aligned with 
university objectives and university 
objectives not clearly articulated;  
Significant excess supply of 
applicants.  
Structural drivers of corruption so leadership 
change alone will be insufficient;  
Evaluation criteria have to be linked to actual 
operations of the university. 
Supervisory and monitoring functions of 
external bodies have to be strengthened to 
identify and prevent predatory corruption.  
 
Good leadership that can move a university towards the formalization of a rules-based 
approach to recruitment and appointments can work in universities where most of the 
underlying structural conditions are favourable. This may be the case, for instance, in 
University 3, the Blind Bidding Model, where adverse leadership could be the most 
pressing problem right now. Even in this case, some prior incremental reforms that 
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enhanced the overall quality of staff may be a necessary precondition for creating 
sufficient internal support for rules-based reforms. In the other corrupt universities that 
we investigated, a number of other necessary policy steps would need to be 
implemented before a forward-looking leadership could feasibly introduce a rules-
based reform agenda. These include the following, depending on the type of university 
in question (Table 4).  
 
First, in some cases it may be necessary to begin by reforming the criteria of funding 
and linking these to achievable performance targets. Effective criteria have to recognize 
the differences in the missions of different universities. Some universities will be 
carrying out high quality teaching and research in a variety of subjects, others will be 
providing vocational training to students with low academic pre-qualifications and will 
be doing little research, and so on. The same funding criteria cannot work for such 
different universities, and the government has to work out appropriate goals and 
funding criteria for different types of universities. The proper specification of 
performance-related funding can create incentives for universities to aspire to improve 
the quality of services they provide and be rewarded for that.  
 
Secondly, in some cases it may also be necessary to examine the mission of the 
university to develop a set of internal criteria for staff evaluation, reward and promotion 
that is consistent with actual university objectives and the capabilities of the majority 
of staff. A potentially serious problem in universities is that formal evaluation criteria 
that are out of line with the real capabilities of many staff members can result in strong 
support for factional politics and corruption. This too has to be a careful university-
specific approach rather than the application of general rules to all universities. If the 
majority of staff carrying out the normal mission of the university feel that their hard 
work will be fairly evaluated and the value they add to students will be fairly 
recognized, support for a rules-based evaluation system can begin to emerge.  
 
Thirdly, in some universities the category of teaching staff required are in significant 
excess supply and this can create strong incentives for predatory behaviour by 
university management. Here, some progress can be made by clearly defining the range 
of qualities required, but in addition, there may have to be a significant strengthening 
of supervisory and monitoring capabilities of the supervising ministry. Without such 
oversight, the exploitation of applicants may not be easy to prevent. 
 
The research in this paper supports the claim that a process analysis of corruption in 
different types of organizations can shed light on the complex factors that can be driving 
similar types of corruption in different organizations. The range of universities we have 
looked at is not necessarily comprehensive and there may be other types of universities 
with distinctively important processes driving corruption in these activities. However, 
we think that we have covered a range of universities and we are likely to have 
identified the most important types of processes that are relevant in these activities. 
Most importantly, we hope to have demonstrated the usefulness of a process-based 
analysis for identifying practical measures for furthering anti-corruption strategies in 
critical areas.   
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Appendix Table: Summary Details of Sample Universities (2013-14) 
 
 
Items 
University 1. 
Transparency and 
Formal Rule-Following 
Model  
University 2. Enterprise 
Model  
University 3. “Blind 
bidding" Model  
Number of 
teachers 600 More than 700 700 
Total revenue of 
the most recent 
financial year 
  300 billion VND 730 billion VND 
   % from state 
budget na  2% 5.68% 
   %  from regular 
training outside 
budget 
na  64% 45.30% 
 %  from irregular 
training outside 
budget 
na  10% 20.68% 
   %  from research 
projects na  23% 19.41% 
   % from other 
sources na  1% 14.61% 
Total number of 
students per year 11000 15590 14620 
   Regular 
undergraduate 
students 
4000 12000 5000 
   Domestic 
Masters students 1500 560 1050 
   PhD students 70 30 120 
   Students in joint-
programs or 
programs 
managed by 
foreign universities 
250 0 200 
  Students in short-
term course or 
irregular programs 
5000 3000 8250 
Quality/Brand 
name compared 
to other 
universities in 
Vietnam 
Top in the field Intermediate  Top in the field 
  Teaching quality 
of teachers 8/10 6/10 9/10 
  Research quality 
of teachers 7/10 3/10 7/10 
Autonomy level Autonomous under 
Decree 43/2006/ND-CP 
since 2008. From 2015, 
fully autonomous in 
principle. The board of 
rectors can decide 
everything from 
personnel, finance, and 
training. 
Autonomous university (no 
state budget for regular 
training programmes) 
Autonomous under 
Decree 43/2006/ND-CP 
since 2008. From 2015, 
autonomous in principle. 
The board of rectors can 
decide everything from 
personnel, finance, and 
training. 
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Supervising 
authority       
Name of the 
supervising 
authority 
Ministry of Education 
and Training 
Directly under another 
ministry  
Ministry of Education and 
Training 
Other related 
supervising 
authorities 
No others Ministry of Education and Training No others 
Supervision  Used to be closely 
monitored but now 
MOET can only approve 
new training programs 
and ministry-level 
research projects. 
MOET still approves 
construction and 
development. 
Closely supervised by 
supervising ministry (all issues 
related to management and 
personnel have to be 
reported and approved by the 
ministry) 
Used to be closely 
monitored but now MOET 
can only approve new 
training programs and 
ministry-level research 
projects. MOET still 
approves construction 
and development. 
Location (relative 
to HQ of 
supervising 
Ministry) 
HCM, far from the 
supervising Ministry 
Hanoi, near the supervising 
Ministry 
Hanoi, near the 
supervising Ministry 
Short history of 
the university 
Established in the mid-
1970s from a pre-
independence 
university. In the mid-
1990s integrated into a 
bigger university in the 
South and then 
separated back by the 
end of 1990s to 
become one of the 14 
top universities in the 
nation. 
Established in the mid-1990s 
by combining several training 
and research units under the 
supervising ministry and 
made part of a big 
corporation in the ministry. 
All the training and research 
units were established a long 
time ago (1950s) to support 
the development of the 
industry.  Recently 
transferred to belong to the 
Ministry and operate as a 
non-business unit. It has been 
the key research and training 
unit for human resources in 
the industry. 
Established in the mid-
1950s and became one of 
the first universities in 
Vietnam. Since then, the 
university has been 
always the leading one in 
the field. 
Powers of the 
rector and other 
institutions  
      
   Rector's power na  Determine personnel, 
finance, and expertise issues 
under direction of the 
Ministry 
Determine all issues 
related to personnel and 
finance under the 
autonomy mechanism, 
and final decisions on 
expertise (in consultation 
with the university 
scientific committee) 
   Deputy rector's 
power 
na  Assistant to the Rector in 
personnel and finance. Can 
direct some operations with 
rector's approval. 
Assistant to the rector in 
some areas as 
empowered by the rector. 
   Power of head of 
faculty/ 
institute 
na  Consult with rector's board 
on recruitment issues. 
Determine issues related to 
training and research 
programs in the 
faculty/institute. 
The head is in charge of 
financial and personnel 
management issues. Head 
of each discipline (within 
each department) is in 
charge of developing 
training programs  
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Items University 4. Centralized Corruption Model  
University 5. Political 
Faction-Driven Model  
University 6. Flea Market 
Exploitation 
Number of teachers 767 600 600 
Total revenue of 
the most recent 
financial year 
Na Na 110 billionVND 
   % from state 
budget 60% Na 30% 
   %  from regular 
training outside 
budget 
1% Na 50% 
 %  from irregular 
training outside 
budget 
35% Na 10% 
   %  from research 
projects 1% Na Small 
   % from other 
sources 
3% (library, book sales 
and sponsors) Na 7% 
Total number of 
students per year 19835 Na 4500-5000 
   Regular 
undergraduate 
students 
15000 na  5141 (2014) 
   Domestic Masters 
students 840 Na 167 (2014) 
   PhD students 35 Na 0 
   Students in joint-
programs or 
programs managed 
by foreign 
universities 
60 Na 0 
  Students in short-
term courses or 
irregular programs 
3900 Na N/A (may be not a lot) 
Quality/Brand 
name compared to 
other universities 
in Vietnam 
Intermediate  High Lower middle 
  Teaching quality of 
teachers 7/10 7/10 
Low in general. Some 
subjects including social 
work and imaging 
techniques better (5/10) 
  Research quality of 
teachers 5/10 7/10 Low in general (2/10) 
Autonomy level Autonomous under 
Decree 43/2006/ND-CP 
with partial autonomy. 
Can design training 
programmes with MOET 
approval and programmes 
without certificates. 
Overall personnel 
numbers have to be 
approved by the ministry. 
Responsible for 40% of 
regular operating costs. 
Na Autonomous university 
under Decree 
43/2006/ND-CP) with 
partial autonomy: 
Personnel decisions need 
approval from the 
ministry for personnel 
from the level of deputy 
head of 
department/faculty.                                                                           
Needs approval from the 
supervising ministry and 
MOET to open major new 
programmes.  
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Supervising 
authority       
Name of the 
supervising 
authority 
Directly under another 
ministry  
Ministry of Education and 
Training 
Directly under another 
ministry  
Other related 
supervising 
authorities 
Ministry of Education and 
Training No others 
Ministry of Education and 
Training 
Supervision  
Managing and approving 
training programs in the 
university. Inspecting and 
monitoring the programs 
 Managing and approving 
training programs in the 
university. Inspecting and 
monitoring the programs 
Pretty closely with the 
supervising ministry 
(issues such as operation 
cost plans need to be 
submitted and approved 
by the supervising 
ministry annually). 
Location (relative to 
HQ of supervising 
Ministry) 
Hanoi, near the 
supervising Ministry 
Tp. HCM, far from the 
supervising Ministry 
Hanoi, near the 
supervising Ministry 
Short history of the 
university 
Established by the end of 
1950s but became 
university just by the end 
of 1990s. In the period 
between, training 
personnel for state 
authorities. 
Established in the mid-
1970s from a pre-
independence university. 
Integrated into a bigger 
university in the South in 
the mid-1990s and then 
separated back at the end 
of the 1990s. One of the 
14 top universities. 
Became a university in the 
mid-2000s. Predecessor 
was a school established 
in the early 1990s to train 
human resource for the 
industry. This university 
has belonged to the 
Ministry and operated as 
a unit under the Ministry. 
Powers of the 
rector and other 
institutions  
      
   Rector's power Determine all issues 
related to personnel and 
finance under the 
autonomy mechanism, 
and final decisions on 
expertise (in consultation 
with the university 
scientific committee) 
Na Determine personnel, 
finance, and expertise 
issues. Rector can sign 
contracts and projects, 
grant degrees and 
notarized copies of 
degrees for students 
   Deputy rector's 
power 
Assistant to the rector on 
some areas as 
empowered by the rector. 
Na Deputy rectors supervise 
activities such as research, 
graduate training, 
inspections and 
administration. 
 Power of head of 
faculty/institute 
The head is in charge of 
issues such as developing 
training programmes and 
materials, managing 
personnel, but not 
financial matters. 
Na The head consults the 
rector's board on 
personnel, expertise, and 
other activities, including 
training programmes, 
teacher evaluation, etc. 
 
Source and Notes: Based on information published by the respective universities in their reports and on 
their websites. The assessments of university rankings and quality of teaching and research were 
judgements made by the authors based on information about the qualifications and publications of 
teaching staff.  
